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INTRODUCTION/ABSTRACT
What do binary (or probabilistic) forecasting abilities
have to do with overall performance? We map the dif-
ference between (univariate) binary predictions, bets and
"beliefs" (expressed as a specific "event" will happen/will
not happen) and real-world continuous payoffs (numeri-
cal benefits or harm from an event) and show the effect of
their conflation and mischaracterization in the decision-
science literature. We also examine the differences under
thin and fat tails. The effects are:
A) Spuriousness of many psychological results
particularly those documenting that humans overestimate
tail probabilities and rare events, or that they overreact
to fears of market crashes, ecological calamities, etc.
Many perceived "biases" are just mischaracterizations
by psychologists. There is also a misuse of Hayekian
arguments in promoting prediction markets.
We quantify such conflations with a metric for
"pseudo-overestimation".
B) Being a "good forecaster" in binary space
doesn’t lead to having a good actual performance,
and vice versa, especially under nonlinearities. A binary
forecasting record is likely to be a reverse indicator under
some classes of distributions. Deeper uncertainty or more
complicated and realistic probability distribution worsen
the conflation .
C) Machine Learning: Some nonlinear payoff func-
tions, while not lending themselves to verbalistic ex-
pressions and "forecasts", are well captured by ML or
expressed in option contracts.
D) Fattailedenss: The difference is exacerbated in the
power law classes of probability distributions.
The appendix shows the mathematical derivations and
exact distribution of the various payoffs, along with
an exact distribution for the Brier score helpful for
other applications such as significance testing and sample
sufficiency.
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I. CONTINUOUS VS. DISCRETE PAYOFFS: DEFINITIONS
AND COMMENTS
Example 1 ("One does not eat beliefs and (binary) forecasts").
In the first volume of the Incerto ( Fooled by Randomness,
2001 [4]), the narrator, a trader, is asked by the manager
"do you predict that the market is going up or down?" "Up",
he answered, with confidence. Then the boss got angry when,
looking at the firm’s exposures, he discovered that the narrator
was short the market, i.e., would benefit from the market going
down.
The trader had difficulties conveying the idea that there
was no contradiction, as someone could hold the (binary)
belief that the market had a higher probability of going up
than down, but that, should it go down, there is a very
small probability that it could go down considerably, hence a
short position had a positive expected return and the rational
response was to engage in a short exposure. "You do not eat
forecasts, but P/L" (or "one does not monetize forecasts") goes
the saying among traders.
If exposures and beliefs do not go in the same direction,
it is because beliefs are verbalistic reductions that contract a
higher dimensional object into a single dimension. To express
the manager’s error in terms of decision-making research,
there can be a conflation in something as elementary as the
notion of a binary event (related to the zeroth moment) or the
probability of an event and expected payoff from it (related to
the first moment and, when nonlinear, to all higher moments)
as the payoff functions of the two can be similar in some
circumstances and different in others.
Comment 1. In short, probabilistic calibration requires esti-
mations of the zeroth moment while the real world requires all
moments (outside of gambling bets or artificial environments
such as psychological experiments where payoffs are neces-
sarily truncated), and it is a central property of fat tails that
higher moments are explosive (even "infinite") and count more
and more.
A. Away from the Verbalistic
While the trader story is mathematically trivial (though the
mistake is committed a bit too often), more serious gaps are
present in decision making and risk management, particularly
when the payoff function is more complicated, or nonlinear
(and related to higher moments). So once we map the contracts
or exposures mathematically, rather than focus on words and
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Fig. 1. Probabilistic calibration (simplified) as seen in the psychology
literature. The x axis shows the estimated probability produced by the
forecaster, the y axis the actual realizations, so if a weather forecaster predicts
30% chance of rain, and rain occurs 30% of the time, they are deemed
"calibrated". We hold that calibration in frequency (probability) space is an
academic exercise (in the bad sense of the word) that mistracks real life
outcomes outside narrow binary bets. It is particularly fallacious under fat
tails.
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Fig. 2. How miscalibration in probability corresponds to miscalibration in
payoff under power laws. The distribution under consideration is Pareto with
tail index α = 1.15
verbal descriptions, some serious distributional issues arise.
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Fig. 3. "Typical patterns" as stated and described in [1], a representative claim
in psychology of decision making that people overestimate small probability
events. The central findings are in 1977 and 1978 [2] and [3]. We note that to
the left, in the estimation part, 1) events such as floods, tornados, botulism,
mostly patently fat tailed variables, matters of severe consequences that agents
might have incorporated in the probability, 2) these probabilities are subjected
to estimation error that, when endogenised, increase the estimation.
Definition 1: Event
A (real-valued) random variable X: Ω → R defined on
the probability space (Ω,F , P ) is a function X(ω) of
the outcome ω ∈ Ω. An event is a measurable subset
(countable or not) of Ω, measurable meaning that it can
be defined through the value(s) of one of several random
variable(s).
Definition 2: Binary forecast/payoff
A binary forecast (belief, or payoff) is a random variable
taking two values
X : Ω→ {X1, X2},
with realizations X1, X2 ∈ R.
In other words, it lives in the binary set (say {0, 1}, {−1, 1},
etc.), i.e., the specified event will or will not take place and, if
there is a payoff, such payoff will be mapped into two finite
numbers (a fixed sum if the event happened, another one if
it didn’t). Unless otherwise specified, in this discussion we
default to the {0, 1} set.
Example of situations in the real world where the payoff is
binary:
• Casino gambling, lotteries , coin flips, "ludic" environ-
ments, or binary options paying a fixed sum if, say,
the stock market falls below a certain point and nothing
otherwise –deemed a form of gambling1.
1Retail binary options are typically used for gambling and have been
banned in many jurisdictions, such as, for instance, by the European Securities
and Markets Authority (ESMA), www.esma.europa.eu, as well as the United
States where it is considered another form of internet gambling, triggering
a complaint by a collection of decision scientists, see Arrow et al. [5]. We
consider such banning as justified since bets have practically no economic
value, compared to financial markets that are widely open to the public, where
natural exposures can be properly offset.
3• Elections where the outcome is binary (e.g., referenda,
U.S. Presidential Elections), though not the economic
effect of the result of the election.2
• Medical prognoses for a single patient entailing survival
or cure over a specified duration, though not the duration
itself as variable, or disease-specific survival expressed
in time, or conditional life expectancy. Also exclude
anything related to epidemiology.
• Whether a given person who has an online profile will
buy or not a unit or more of a specific product at a given
time (not the quantity or units).
Comment 2 (A binary belief is equivalent to a payoff). A
binary "belief" should map to an economic payoff (under
some scaling or normalization necessarily to constitute a
probability), an insight owed to De Finetti [6] who held that a
"belief" and a "prediction" (when they are concerned with two
distinct outcomes) map into the equivalent of the expectation
of a binary random variable and bets with a payoff in {0, 1}.
An "opinion" becomes a choice price for a gamble, and one
at which one is equally willing to buy or sell. Inconsistent
opinions therefore would lead to a violation of arbitrage rules,
such as the "Dutch book", where a combination of mispriced
bets can guarantee a future loss.
Definition 3: Real world open continuous payoff
X : Ω→ [a,∞) ∨ (−∞, b] ∨ (−∞,∞)
A continuous payoff "lives" in an interval, not a finite set.
It corresponds to an unbounded random variable either
doubly unbounded or semi-bounded, with the bound on
one side (one tailed variable).
Caveat: We are limiting for the purposes of our study the
consideration to binary vs. continuous and open-ended (i.e.,
no compact support). Many discrete payoffs are subsumed
into the continuous class using standard arguments of ap-
proximation. We are also omitting triplets, that is, payoffs in,
say {−1, 0, 3}, as these obey the properties of binaries (and
can be constructed using a sum of binaries). Further, many
variable with a floor and a remote ceiling (hence, formally
with compact support), such as the number of victims or a
catastrophe, are analytically and practically treated as if they
were open-ended [7].
Example of situations in the real world where the payoff is
continuous:
• Wars casualties, calamities due to earthquake, medical
bills, etc.
• Magnitude of a market crash, severity of a recession, rate
of inflation
• Income from a strategy
• Sales and profitability of a new product
2Note the absence of spontaneously forming gambling markets with binary
payoffs for continuous variables. The exception might have been binary
options but these did not remain in fashion for very long, from the experiences
of the author, for a period between 1993 and 1998, largely motivated by tax
gimmicks.
• In general, anything covered by an insurance contract
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Fig. 4. Comparing the payoff of a binary bet (The Heaviside θ(.)) to a
continuous open-ended exposure g(x). Visibly there is no way to match the
(mathematical) derivatives for any form of hedging.
Most natural and socio-economic variables are continuous
and their statistical distribution does not have a compact
support in the sense that we do not have a handle of an exact
upper bound.
Example 2. Predictive analytics in binary space {0, 1} can
be successful in forecasting if, from his online activity, online
consumer Iannis Papadopoulos will purchase a certain item,
say a wedding ring, based solely on computation of the
probability. But the probability of the "success" for a potential
new product might be –as with the trader’s story– misleading.
Given that company sales are typically fat tailed, a very low
probability of success might still be satisfactory to make a
decision. Consider venture capital or option trading –an out
of the money option can often be attractive yet may have less
than 1 in 1000 probability of ever paying off.
More significantly, the tracking error for probability guesses
will not map to that of the performance. λ(M4) would.
This difference is well known by option traders as there
are financial derivative contracts called "binaries" that pay
in the binary set {0, 1} (say if the underlying asset S, say,
exceeds a strike price K), while others called "vanilla" that
pay in [0,∞), i.e. max(S − K, 0) (or, worse, in (−∞, 0)
for the seller can now be exposed to bankruptcy owing to
the unbounded exposure). The considerable mathematical and
economic difference between the two has been discussed and
is the subject of Dynamic Hedging: Managing Vanilla and
Exotic Options [8]. Given that the former are bets paying a
fixed amount and the latter have full payoff, one cannot be
properly replicated (or hedged) using another, especially under
fat tails and parametric uncertainty –meaning performance in
one does not translate to performance into the other. While this
knowledge is well known in mathematical finance it doesn’t
seem to have been passed on to the decision-theory literature.
Comment 3 (Derivatives theory). Our approach here is in-
spired from derivatives (or option) theory and practice where
there are different types of derivative contracts, 1) those with
binary payoffs (that pay a fixed sum if an event happens) and
42) "vanilla" ones (standard options with continuous payoffs).
It is practically impossible to hedge one with another [8].
Furthermore a bet with a strike price K and a call option with
same strike K, with K in the tails of the distribution, almost
always have their valuations react in opposite ways when one
increases the kurtosis of the distribution, (while preserving
the first three moments) or, in an example further down in the
lognormal environment, when one increases uncertainty via
the scale of the distribution.
Comment 4 (Term sheets). Note that, thanks to "term sheets"
that are necessary both legally and mathematically, financial
derivatives practive provides precise legalistic mapping of
payoffs in a way to make their mathematical, statistical, and
economic differences salient.
There has been a tension between prediction markets and
real financial markets. As we can show here, prediction
markets may be useful for gamblers, but they cannot hedge
economic exposures.
The mathematics of the difference and the impossibility of
hedging can be shown in the following. Let X be a random
variable in R, we have the payoff of the bet or the prediction
θK : R→ {0, 1},
θK(x) =
{
1, x ≥ K
0 otherwise, (1)
and g : R→ R that of the natural exposure. Since ∂∂xθK(x) is
a Dirac delta function at K, δ(K) and ∂)∂xgk(x) is at least once
differentiable for x ≥ K (or constant in case the exposure is
globally linear or, like an option, piecewise linear above K),
matching derivatives for the purposes of offsetting variations
is not a possible strategy.3 The point is illustrated in Fig 4.
B. There is no defined "collapse", "disaster", or "success"
under fat tails
The fact that an "event" has some uncertainty around its
magnitude carries some mathematical consequences. Some
verbalistic papers in 2019 still commit the fallacy of binarizing
an event in [0,∞): A recent paper on calibration of beliefs
says "...if a person claims that the United States is on the
verge of an economic collapse or that a climate disaster is
imminent..." An economic "collapse" or a climate "disaster"
must not be expressed as an event in {0, 1} when in the real
world it can take many values. For that, a characteristic scale
is required. In fact under fat tails, there is no "typical" collapse
or disaster, owing to the absence of characteristic scale, hence
verbal binary predictions or beliefs cannot be used as gauges.
We present the difference between thin tailed and fat tailed
domains as follows.
3To replicate an open-ended continuous payoff with binaries, one needs an
infinite series of bets, which cancels the entire idea of a prediction market
by transforming it into a financial market. Distributions with compact support
always have finite moments, not the case of those on the real line.
Definition 4: Characteristic scale
Let X be a random variable that lives in either (0,∞)
or (−∞,∞) and E the expectation operator under "real
world" (physical) distribution. By classical results [9]:
lim
K→∞
1
K
E(X|X>K) = λ, (2)
• If λ = 1 , X is said to be in the thin tailed class
D1 and has a characteristic scale
• If λ > 1 , X is said to be in the fat tailed regular
variation class D2 and has no characteristic scale
• If
lim
K→∞
E(X|X>K)−K = µ
where µ > 0, then X is in the borderline exponen-
tial class
The point can be made clear as follows. One cannot have
a binary contract that adequately hedges someone against a
"collapse", given that one cannot know in advance the size of
the collapse or how much the face value or such contract needs
to be. On the other hand, an insurance contract or option with
continuous payoff would provide a satisfactory hedge. Another
way to view it: reducing these events to verbalistic "collapse",
"disaster" is equivalent to a health insurance payout of a lump
sum if one is "very ill" –regardless of the nature and gravity
of the illness – and 0 otherwise.
And it is highly flawed to separate payoff and probability
in the integral of expected payoff.4 Some experiments of the
type shown in Figure ask agents what is their estimates
of deaths from botulism or some such disease: agents are
blamed for misunderstanding the probability. This is rather
a problem with the experiment: people do not necessarily
separate probabilities from payoffs.
II. SPURIOUS OVERESTIMATION OF TAIL PROBABILITY IN
THE PSYCHOLOGY LITERATURE
4 Practically all economic and informational variables have been shown
since the 1960s to belong to the D2 class, or at least the intermediate
subexponential class (which includes the lognormal), [10], [11], [12], [13],
[4], along with social variables such as size of cities, words in languages,
connections in networks, size of firms, incomes for firms, macroeconomic
data, monetary data, victims from interstate conflicts and civil wars[14], [7],
operational risk, damage from earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes and other
natural calamities, income inequality [15], etc. Which leaves us with the more
rational question: where are Gaussian variables? These appear to be at best
one order of magnitude fewer in decisions entailing formal predictions.
5Definition 5: Substitution of integral
Let K ∈ R+ be a threshold, f(.) a density function and
pK ∈ [0, 1] the probability of exceeding it, and g(x) an
impact function. Let I1 be the expected payoff above K:
I1 =
∫ ∞
K
g(x)f(x) dx,
and Let I2 be the impact at K multiplied by the proba-
bility of exceeding K:
I2 = g(K)
∫ ∞
K
f(x) dx = g(K)pK .
The substitution comes from conflating I1 and I2, which
becomes an identity if and only if g(.) is constant above
K (say g(x) = θK(x), the Heaviside theta function). For
g(.) a variable function with positive first derivative, I1
can be close to I2 only under thin-tailed distributions,
not under the fat tailed ones.
For the discussions and examples in this section assume
g(x) = x as we will consider the more advanced nonlinear
case in Section V.
Theorem 1: Convergence of I1I2
If X is in the thin tailed class D1 as described in 2,
lim
K→∞
I1
I2
= 1 (3)
If X is in the regular variation class D2,
lim
K→∞
I1
I2
= λ > 1. (4)
Proof. From Eq. 2. Further comments:
A. Thin tails
By our very definition of a thin tailed distribution (more
generally any distribution outside the subexponential class,
indexed by (g)), where f (g)(.) is the PDF:
lim
K→∞
∫∞
K
xf (g)(x) dx
K
∫∞
K
f (g)(x) dx
=
I1
I2
= 1. (5)
Special case of a Gaussian: Let g(.) be the PDF of predomi-
nantly used Gaussian distribution (centered and normalized),
∫ ∞
K
xg(x) dx =
e−
K2
2√
2pi
(6)
and Kp = 12 erfc
(
K√
2
)
, where erfc is the complementary
error function, and Kp is the threshold corresponding to the
probability p.
We note that Kp I1I2 corresponds to the inverse Mills ratio
used in insurance.
B. Fat tails
For all distributions in the regular variation class, defined
by their tail survival function: for K large,
P(X > K) ≈ LK−α, α > 1,
where L > 0 and f (p) is the PDF of a member of that class:
lim
Kp→∞
∫∞
K
xf (p)(x) dx
K
∫∞
Kp
f (p)(x) dx
=
α
α− 1 > 1 (7)
C. Conflations
1) Conflation of I1 and I2: In numerous experiments,
which include the prospect theory paper by Kahneman and
Tversky (1978) [16], it has been repeatedly established that
agents overestimate small probabilities in experiments where
the odds are shown to them, and when the outcome corre-
sponds to a single payoff. The well known Kahneman-Tversky
result proved robust, but interpretations make erroneous claims
from it. Practically all the subsequent literature, relies on
I2 and conflates it with I1, what this author has called the
ludic fallacy in The Black Swan [4], as games are necessarily
truncating a dimension from reality. The psychological results
might be robust, in the sense that they replicate when repeated
in the exact similar conditions, but all the claims outside these
conditions and extensions to real risks will be an exceedingly
dubious generalization –given that our exposures in the real
world rarely map to I1. Furthermore, one can overestimate the
probability yet underestimate the expected payoff.
2) Stickiness of the conflation: The misinterpretation is
still made four decades after Kahneman-Tversky (1979). In
a review of behavioral economics, with emphasis on miscacu-
lation of probability, Barberis (2003) [17] treats I1 = I2. And
Arrow et al. [5], a long list of decision scientists pleading for
deregulation of the betting markets also misrepresented the
fitness of these binary forecasts to the real world (particularly
in the presence of real financial markets).
Another stringent –and dangerous –example is the "default
VaR" (Value at risk) which is explicitly given as I2, i.e. default
probability x(1− expected recovery rate), which can be quite
different from the actual loss expectation in case of default.
Finance presents erroneous approximations of CVaR, and the
approximation is the risk-management flaw that may have
caused the crisis of 2008 [18].
The fallacious argument is that they compute the recovery
rate as the expected value of collateral, without conditioning
by the default event. The expected value of the collateral
conditionally to a default is often far less then its unconditional
expectation. In 2007, after a massive series of foreclosures, the
value of most collaterals dropped to about 1/3 of its expected
value!
3) Misunderstanding of Hayek’s knowledge arguments:
"Hayekian" arguments for the consolidation of beliefs via
prices does not lead to prediction markets as discussed in such
pieces as [19], or Sunstein’s [20]: prices exist in financial and
commercial markets; prices are not binary bets. For Hayek [21]
consolidation of knowledge is done via prices and arbitrageurs
6TABLE I
GAUSSIAN PSEUDO-OVERESTIMATION
p Kp
∫∞
Kp
xf(x)dx Kp
∫∞
Kp
f(x)dx p∗ p
∗
p
1
10
1.28 1.75× 10−1 1.28× 10−1 1.36× 10−1 1.36
1
100
2.32 2.66× 10−2 2.32× 10−2 1.14× 10−2 1.14
1
1000
3.09 3.36× 10−3 3.09× 10−3 1.08× 10−3 1.08
1
10000
3.71 3.95× 10−4 3.71× 10−4 1.06× 10−4 1.06
(his words)–and arbitrageurs trade products, services, and
financial securities, not binary bets.
Definition 6: Corrected probability in binarized ex-
periments
Let p∗ be the equivalent probability to make I1 = I2 and
eliminate the effect of the error, so
p∗ = {p : I1 = I2 = K}
Now let’ s solve for Kp "in the tails", working with a
probability p. For the Gaussian, Kp =
√
2erfc−1(2p); for the
Paretan tailed distribution, Kp = p−1/α.
Hence, for a Paretan distribution, the ratio of real continuous
probability to the binary one
p∗
p
=
α
1− α
which can allow in absurd cases p∗ to exceed 1 when the
distribution is grossly misspecified.
Tables I and II show, for a probability level p, the corre-
sponding tail level Kp, such as
Kp = {inf K : P(X > K) > p} ,
and the corresponding adjusted probability p∗ that de-binarize
the event 56– probabilities here need to be in the bottom
half, i.e., p < .5. Note that we are operating under the mild
case of known probability distributions, as it gets worse under
parametric uncertainty.7
The most commonly known distribution among the public,
the "Pareto 80/20" (based on Pareto discovering that 20 percent
of the people in Italy owned 80 percent of the land), maps to
a tail index α = 1.16, so the adjusted probability is > 7 times
the naive one.
4) Example of probability and expected payoff reacting in
opposite direction under increase in uncertainty: An example
showing how, under a skewed distribution, the binary and
the expectation reacting in opposite directions is as follows.
Consider the risk-neutral lognormal distribution L(X0− 1σ2 , σ)
with pdf fL(.), mean X0 and variance
(
eσ
2 − 1
)
X20 . We can
5The analysis is invariant to whether we use the right or left tail .By
convention, finance uses negative value for losses, whereas other areas of
risk management express the negative of the random variance, hence focus
on the right tail.
6Kp is equivalent to the Value at Risk V aRp in finance, where p is the
probability of loss.
7Note the van der Wijk’s law, see Cirillo [22]: I1
I2
is related to what is
called in finance the expected shortfall for Kp.
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Fig. 5. Comparing the three payoffs under two distributions –the binary has
the same profile regardless of whether the distribution is thin or fat tailed.
The first two subfigures are to scale, the third (representing the Pareto 80/20
with α = 1.16 requires multiplying the scale by two orders of magnitude.
TABLE II
PARETAN PSEUDO-OVERESTIMATION
p Kp
∫∞
Kp
xf(x)dx Kp
∫∞
Kp
f(x)dx p∗ p
∗
p
1
10
8.1 8.92 0.811 1.1 (sic) 11.
1
100
65.7 7.23 0.65 0.11 11.
1
1000
533 5.87 0.53 0.011 11.
1
10000
4328 4.76 0.43 0.0011 11.
7increase its uncertainty with the parameter σ. We have the
expectation of a contract above X0, E>X0 :
E>X0 =
∫ ∞
X0
xfL(x) dx =
1
2
X0
(
1 + erf
(
σ
2
√
2
))
and the probability of exceeding X0,
P(X > X0) =
1
2
(
1− erf
(
σ
2
√
2
))
,
where erf is the error function. As σ rises erf
(
σ
2
√
2
)
→ 1,
with E>X0 → X0 and P(X > X0) → 0. This example is
well known by option traders (see Dynamic Hedging [8]) as
the binary option struck at X0 goes to 0 while the standard
call of the same strike rises considerably to reach the level
of the asset –regardless of strike. This is typically the case
with venture capital: the riskier the project, the less likely it
is to succeed but the more rewarding in case of success. So,
the expectation can go to +∞ while to probability of success
goes to 0.
D. Distributional Uncertainty
Remark 1: Distributional uncertainty
Owing to Jensen’s inequality, the discrepancy (I1 − I2)
increases under parameter uncertainty, expressed in
higher kurtosis, via stochasticity of σ the scale of the
thin-tailed distribution, or that of α the tail index of the
Paretan one.
Proof. First, the Gaussian world. We consider the effect of
I1
I2
=
∫∞
K
xfg(x) under stochastic volatility, i.e. the parameter
from increase of volatility. Let σ be the scale of the Gaussian,
with K constant:
∂2(
∫∞
K
xfg(x)dx)
∂σ2
=
K2e−
K2
2σ2 (K − σ)(K + σ)√
2piσ5
(8)
which is positive for all values of K > σ, that is, starting one
standard deviations away in the tails.
Second, consider the sensitivity to parameter uncertainty for
α in the Paretan case:
(9)
∂2
(∫∞
K
xf (p)(x)dx
)
∂α2
=
K1−α((α− 1) log(K)((α− 1)α log(K) + 2) + 2)
(α− 1)3
which increases markedly at lower values of α meaning the
fatter the tails, the worse the uncertainty about the expected
payoff and the larger the difference between I1 and I2.
III. CALIBRATION AND MISCALIBRATION
The psychology literature also examines the "calibration"
of probabilistic assessment –an evaluation of how close some-
one providing odds of events turns out to be on average
(under some operation of the law of large number deemed
satisfactory) [2], [23], see Fig. 2. The methods, for the
TABLE III
SCORING METRICS FOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Metric Name Fitness to reality
P (r)(T ) Cumulative P/L Adapted to real world distributions, par-
ticularly under a survival filter
P (p)(n) Tally of Bets Misrepresents the performance under
fat tails, works only for binary bets
and/or thin tailed domains.
λ(n) Brier Score Misrepresents performance precision
under fat tails, ignores higher moments.
λ
(M4)
n M4 Score Represents precision not exactly real
world performance but maps to real
distribution of underlying variables.
λ
(M5)
n Proposed M5
Score
Represents both precision and survival
conditions by predicting extrema of
time series.
g(.) Machine learning
nonlinear payoff
function (not a
metric)
Expresses exposures without verbalism
and reflects true economic or other P/L.
Resembles financial derivatives term
sheets.
reasons we have shown here, are highly flawed except in
narrow circumstances of purely binary payoffs (such as those
entailing a "win/lose" outcome) –and generalizing from these
payoffs is either not possible or produces misleading results.
Accordingly, Fig. makes little sense empirically.
At the core, calibration metrics such as the Brier score are
always thin-tailed, when the variable under measurement is
fat-tailed, which worsens the tractability.
To use again the saying "You do not eat forecasts", most
businesses have severely skewed payoffs, so being calibrated
in probability is meaningless.
Remark 2: Distributional differences
Binary forecasts and calibration metrics via the Brier
score belong to the thin-tailed class.
We will show proofs next.
IV. SCORING METRICS
This section, summarized in Table III, compares the prob-
ability distributions of the various metrics used to measure
performance, either by explicit formulation or by linking it to
a certain probability class. Clearly one may be mismeasuring
performance if the random variable is in the wrong probability
class. Different underlying distributions will require a different
number of sample sizes owing to the differences in the way
the law of numbers operates across distributions. A series of
binary forecasts will converge very rapidly to a thin-tailed
Gaussian even if the underlying distribution is fat-tailed, but
an economic P/L tracking performance for someone with a
real exposure will require a considerably larger sample size
if, say, the underlying is Pareto distributed [24].
We start by precise expressions for the four possible ones:
1) Real world performance under conditions of survival, or,
in other words, P/L or a quantitative cumulative score.
82) A tally of bets, the naive sum of how often a person’s
binary prediction is correct
3) De Finetti’s Brier score λ(B)n
4) The M4 score λM4n for n observations used in the M4
competition, and its prosed sequel M5.
1) P/L in Payoff Space (under survival condition): The
"P/L" is short for the natural profit and loss index, that is, a
cumulative account of performance. Let Xi be realizations of
an unidimensional generic random variable X with support in
R and t = 1, 2, . . . n. Real world payoffs Pr(.) are expressed
in a simplified way as
Pr(n) = P (0) +
∑
k≤N
g(xt), (10)
where gt : R → R is a measurable function representing the
payoff; g may be path dependent (to accommodate a survival
condition), that is, it is a function of the preceding period
τ < t or on the cumulative sum
∑
τ≤t g(xτ ) to introduce an
absorbing barrier, say, bankruptcy avoidance, in which case
we write:
P (r)(T ) = P (r)(0) +
∑
t≤n
1(
∑
τ<t g(xτ )>b)
g(xt), (11)
where b is is any arbitrary number in R that we call the survival
mark and 1(.) an indicator function ∈ {0, 1}.
The last condition from the indicator function in Eq. 11 is
meant to handle ergodicity or lack of it [4].
Comment 5. P/L tautologically corresponds to the real world
distribution, with an absorbing barrier at the survival condi-
tion.
2) Frequency Space, : The standard psychology literature
has two approaches.
A-When tallying forecasts as a counter:
P (p)(n) =
1
n
∑
i≤n
1Xt∈χ, (12)
where 1Xt∈χ ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator that the random variable
x ∈ χt in in the "forecast range", and T the total number of
such forecasting events. where ft ∈ [0, 1] is the probability
announced by the forecaster for event t
B-When dealing with a score (calibration method): in the
absence of a visible net performance, researchers produce
some more advanced metric or score to measure calibra-
tion. We select below the gold standard", De Finetti’s Brier
score(DeFinetti, [25]). It is favored since it doesn’t allow ar-
bitrage and requires perfect probabilistic calibration: someone
betting than an event has a probability 1 of occurring will get
a perfect score only if the event occurs all the time.
λ(B)n =
1
n
∑
t≤n
(ft − 1Xt∈χ)2. (13)
which needs to be minimized for a perfect probability assessor.
3) Applications: M4 and M5 Competitions: The M series
(Makridakis [26]) evaluate forecasters using various methods
to predict a point estimate (along with a range of possible
values). The last competition in 2018, M4, largely relied on a
score, λM4 , which works well in situations where one has to
forecast the first moment of the distribution.
Definition 7: The M4 score
The M4 competition (Makridakis et al.[26]) judges com-
petitors on the following metric
λ(M4)n =
1
n
n∑
i
|Xfi −Xri | (14)
where Xfi is the forecast for variable i as a point
estimate, Xri is the realized variable and n the number
of experiments under scrutiny.
The suggest M5 score (expected for 2020) adds the forecasts
of extrema of the variables under considerations.
A. Deriving Distributions
1) Distribution of P (p)(n):
Remark 3
The tally of binary forecast P (p)(n) is asymptotically
normal with mean p and standard deviation
√
1
n (p− p2)
regardless of the distribution class of the random vari-
able X .
The results are quite standard, but see appendix for the re-
derivations.
2) Distribution of the Brier Score λn:
Theorem 2
Regardless of the distribution of the random vari-
able X , without even assuming independence of (f1 −
1A1), . . . , (fn − 1An), for n < +∞, the score λn has
all moments of order q, E(λqn) < +∞.
Proof. For all i, (fi − 1Ai)2 ≤ 1 .
We can get actually closer to a full distribution of the score
across independent betting policies. Assume binary predictions
fi are independent and follow a beta distribution B(a, b)
(which approximates or includes all unimodal distributions in
[0, 1] (plus a Bernoulli via two Dirac functions), and let p be
9the rate of success p = E (1Ai), the characteristic function of
λn for n evaluations of the Brier score is
ϕn(t) = pi
n/2
(
2−a−b+1Γ(a+ b)(
p 2F˜2
(
b+ 1
2
,
b
2
;
a+ b
2
,
1
2
(a+ b+ 1);
it
n
)
− (p− 1) 2F˜2
(
a+ 1
2
,
a
2
;
a+ b
2
,
1
2
(a+ b+ 1);
it
n
)))
(15)
Here 2F˜2 is the generalized hypergeometric function reg-
ularized 2F˜2(., .; ., .; .) = 2
F2(a;b;z)
(Γ(b1)...Γ(bq))
and pFq(a; b; z) has
series expansion
∑∞
k=0
(a1)k...(ap)k
(b1)k...(bp)k
zk/k!, were (a)(.) is the
Pockhammer symbol.
Hence we can prove the following: under the conditions of
independence of the summands stated above,
λn
D−→ N (µ, σn) (16)
where N denotes the Gaussian distribution with for first
argument the mean and for second argument the standard
deviation.
The proof and parametrization of µ and σn is in the
appendix.
3) Distribution of the economic P/L or quantitative measure
Pr:
Remark 4
Conditional on survival to time T , the distribution of the
quantitative measure P (r)(T ) will follow the distribution
of the underlying variable g(x).
The discussion is straightforward if there is no absorbing
barrier (i.e., no survival condition).
4) Distribution of the M4 score: The distribution of an
absolute deviation is in the same probability class as the
variable itself. Thee Brier score is in the norm L2 and is based
on the second moment (which always exists) as De Finetti has
shown that it is more efficient to just a probability in square
deviations. However for nonbinaries, it is vastly more efficient
under fat tails to rely on absolute deviations, even when the
second moment exists [27].
V. NON-VERBALISTIC PAYOFF FUNCTIONS AND THE
GOOD NEWS FROM MACHINE LEARNING
Earlier examples focused on simple payoff functions, with
some cases where the conflation I1 and I2 can be benign
(under the condition of being in a thin tailed environment).
However
Inseparability of probability under nonlinear payoff func-
tion: Now when we introduce a payoff function g(.) that
is nonlinear, that is that the economic or other quantifiable
response to the random variable X varies with the levels of
X , the discrepancy becomes greater and the conflation worse.
Comment 6 (Probability as an integration kernel). Probability
is just a kernel inside an integral or a summation, not a real
thing on its own. The economic world is about quantitative
payoffs.
Remark 5: Inseparability of probability
Let F : A → [0, 1] be a probability distribution (with
derivative f ) and g : R → R a measurable function,
the "payoff"". Clearly, for A′ a subset of A:∫
A′
g(x)dF (x) =
∫
A′
f(x)g(x)dx
6=
∫
A′
f(x)dx g
(∫
A′
dx
)
In discrete terms, with pi(.) a probability mass func-
tion:
(17)
∑
x ∈A′
pi(x)g(x) 6=
∑
x∈A′
pi(x) g
(
1
n
∑
x∈A′
x
)
= probability of event
× payoff of average event
Proof. Immediate by Jensen’s inequality.
In other words, the probability of an event is an expected
payoff only when, as we saw earlier, g(x) is a Heaviside theta
function.
Next we focus on functions tractable mathematically or
legally but not reliable verbalistically via "beliefs" or "pre-
dictions".
1) Misunderstanding g: Figure 6 showing the mishedging
story of Morgan Stanley is illustrative of verbalistic notions
such as "collapse" mis-expressed in nonlinear exposures. In
2007 the Wall Street firm Morgan Stanley decided to "hedge"
against a real estate "collapse", before the market in real estate
started declining. The problem is that they didn’t realize that
"collapse" could take many values, some worse than they
expected, and set themselves up to benefit if there were a mild
decline, but lose much if there is a larger one. They ended up
right in predicting the crisis, but lose $10 billion from the
"hedge".
Figure 7 shows a more complicated payoff, dubbed a
"butterfly"
2) g and machine learning: We note that g maps to various
machine learning functions that produce exhaustive nonlinear-
ities via the universal universal approximation theorem (Cy-
benko [28]), or the generalized option payoff decompositions
(see Dynamic Hedging [8]).
Consider the function ρ : (−∞,∞)→ [K,∞), with K, the
r.v. X ∈ R:
ρK,p(x) = k +
log
(
ep(x−K) + 1
)
p
(18)
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Fig. 6. The Morgan Stanley Story: an example of an elementary nonlinear
payoff that cannot be described verbalistically. This exposure is called in
derivatives traders jargon a "Christmas Tree", achieved by purchasing a put
with strike K and selling a put with lower strike K −∆1 and another with
even lower strike K −∆2, with ∆2 ≥ ∆1 ≥ 0.
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Fig. 7. A butterfly (built via a sum of options or ReLu ρKi ), with open
tails on both sides and flipping first and second derivatives. This example
is particularly potent as it has no verbalistic correspondence but can be
understood by option traders and machine learning.
We can express all nonlinear payoff functions g as, with the
weighting ωi ∈ R:
g(x) =
∑
i
ωi ρKi,p(x) (19)
by some similarity, ρK,p(x) maps to the value a call price with
strike K and time t to expiration normalized to 1, all rates set
at 0, with sole other parameter σ the standard deviation of the
underlying.
We note that the expectation of g(.) is the sum of expecta-
tion of the ReLu functions:
E (g(x)) =
∑
i
ωi E (ρKi,p(x)) (20)
The variance and other higher order statistical measurements
are harder to obtain in closed or simple form.
Comment 7. Risk management is about changing the payoff
function g(.) rather than making "good forecasts".
We note than λ is not a metric but a target to which one
can apply various metrics.
Survivall
Decision making is sequential. Accordingly, miscalibration
may be a good idea if it reduces the odds of being absorbed.
See the appendix of Skin in the Game [4], which shows the
difference between ensemble probability and time probability.
The expectation of the sum of n gamblers over a given day is
different from that of a single gambler over n days, owing to
the conditioning.
In that sense, measuring the performance of an agent who
will eventually go bust (with probability one) is meaningless.8
VI. CONCLUSION:
Finally, that in the real world, it is the net performance
(economic or other) that counts, and making "calibration"
mistakes where it doesn’t matter or can be helpful should
be encouraged, not penalized. The bias variance argument is
well known in machine learning [29] as means to increase
performance, in discussions of rationality (see Skin in the
Game [4]) as a necessary mechanism for survival, and a very
helpful psychological adaptation (Brighton and Gigerenzer
[30] show a potent argument that if it is a bias, it is a pretty
useful one.) If a mistake doesn’t cost you anything –or helps
you survive or improve your outcomes– it is clearly not a
mistake. And if it costs you something, and has been present
in society for a long time, consider that there may be hidden
evolutionary advantages to these types of mistakes –of the
following sort: mistaking a bear for a stone is worse than
mistaking a stone for a bear.
We have shown that, in risk management, one should never
operate in probability space.
APPENDIX
A. Distribution of Binary Tally P (p)(n)
We are dealing with an average of Bernoulli random vari-
ables, with well known results but worth redoing. The charac-
teristic function of a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p is
ψ(t) = 1−p+E(It)p. We are concerned with the N -summed
cumulant generating function ψ′(ω) = logψ( ωN )
N . We have
κ(p) the cumulant of order p:
κ(p) = −ip ∂
pψ′
∂tp
∣∣∣∣
t→0
So: κ(1) = p, κ(2) = (1−p)pN , κ(3) =
(p−1)p(2p−1)
N2 , κ(4) =
(1−p)p(6(p−1)p+1)
N3 , which proves that P
(p)(N) converges by
the law of large numbers at speed
√
N , and by the central
limit theorem arrives to the Gaussian at a rate of 1N , (since
from the cumulants above, its kurtosis = 3− 6(p−1)p+1n(p−1)p ).
B. Distribution of the Brier Score
Base probability f : First, we consider the distribution of
f the base probability. We use a beta distribution that covers
both the conditional and unconditional case (it is a matter of
parametrization of a and b in Eq. 15).
8The M5 competition is expected to correct for that by making "predictors"
predict the minimum (or maximum) in a time series.
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Distribution of the probability: Let us refresh a standard
result behind nonparametric discussions and tests, dating from
Kolmogorov [31] to show the rationale behind the claim that
the probability distribution of probability (sic) is robust –in
other words the distribution of the probability of X doesn’t
depend on the distribution of X , ([32] [23]).
The probability integral transform is as follows. Let X have
a continuous distribution for which the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) is FX . Then –in the absence of additional
information –the random variable U defined as U = FX(X)
is uniform between 0 and 1.The proof is as follows: For t ∈
[0, 1],
P(Y ≤ u) =
P (FX(X) ≤ u) = P (X ≤ F−1X (u)) = FX(F−1X (u)) = u
(21)
which is the cumulative distribution function of the uniform.
This is the case regardless of the probability distribution of
X .
Clearly we are dealing with 1) f beta distributed (either as
a special case the uniform distribution when purely random,
as derived above, or a beta distribution when one has some
accuracy, for which the uniform is a special case), and 2) 1At
a Bernoulli variable with probability p.
Let us consider the general case. Let ga,b be the PDF of the
Beta:
ga,b(x) =
xa−1(1− x)b−1
B(a, b)
, 0 < x < 1
The results, a bit unwieldy but controllable:
µ =
(
a2(−(p− 1))− ap+ a+ b(b+ 1)p)Γ(a+ b)
Γ(a+ b+ 2)
σ2n = −
1
n(a+ b)2(a+ b+ 1)2
(
a2(p− 1) + a(p− 1)
− b(b+ 1)p)2 + 1
(a+ b+ 2)(a+ b+ 3)
(a+ b)(a+ b
+ 1)(p(a− b)(a+ b+ 3)(a(a+ 3) + (b+ 1)(b+ 2))
− a(a+ 1)(a+ 2)(a+ 3))
We can further verify that the Brier score has thinner tails
than the Gaussian as its kurtosis is lower than 3.
Proof. We start with yj = (f − 1Aj), the difference between
a continuous Beta distributed random variable and a discrete
Bernoulli one, both indexed by j. The characteristic function
of yj , Ψ
(y)
f =
(
1 + p
(−1 + e−it)) 1F1(a; a + b; it) where
1F1(.; .; .) is the hypergeometric distribution 1F1(a; b; z) =∑∞
k=0
ak
zk
k !
bk
.
From here we get the characteristic function for y2j = (fj−
1Aj)
2
Ψ(y
2)(t) =
√
pi2−a−b+1Γ(a
+ b)
(
p 2F˜2
(
b+ 1
2
,
b
2
;
a+ b
2
,
1
2
(a+ b+ 1); it
)
− (p
− 1) 2F˜2
(
a+ 1
2
,
a
2
;
a+ b
2
,
1
2
(a+ b+ 1); it
))
(22)
where 2F˜2 is the generalized hypergeometric function reg-
ularized 2F˜2(., .; ., .; .) = 2
F2(a;b;z)
(Γ(b1)...Γ(bq))
and pFq(a; b; z) has
series expansion
∑∞
k=0
(a1)k...(ap)k
(b1)k...(bp)k
zk/k!, were (a)(.) is the
Pockhammer symbol.
We can proceed to prove directly from there the convergence
in distribution for the average 1n
∑n
i y
2
i :
(23)
lim
n→∞Ψy
2(t/n)n =
exp
(
− it(p(a− b)(a+ b+ 1)− a(a+ 1))
(a+ b)(a+ b+ 1)
)
which is that of a degenerate Gaussian (Dirac) with location
parameter
p(b−a)+ a(a+1)a+b+1
a+b .
We can finally assess the speed of convergence, the rate
at which higher moments map to those of a Gaussian dis-
tribution: consider the behavior of the 4th cumulant κ4 =
−i∂4 log Ψ.(.)∂t4 |t→0:
1) in the maximum entropy case of a = b = 1:
κ4|a=1,b=1= − 6
7n
regardless of p.
2) In the maximum variance case, using l’Hôpital:
lim
a→0
b→0
κ4 = −6(p− 1)p+ 1
n(p− 1)p
Se we have κ4
κ22
→0
n→∞ at rate n
−1.
Further, we can extract its probability density function of
the Brier score for N = 1: for 0 < z < 1,
p(z)
=
Γ(a+ b)
(
(p− 1)za/2 (1−√z)b − p (1−√z)a zb/2
)
2 (
√
z − 1) zΓ(a)Γ(b) .
(24)
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